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The nationalization of politics is a hotly discussed issue in electoral studies. In this on-going 
debate, the question of the nationalization (or the lack thereof) of local elections had stayed 
until recently somewhat apart because of the specific nature of this level of government. 
Local lists remain indeed a distinctive feature of local politics in most European countries. In 
the seminal volume, Farewell to the Party Model? (Reiser and Holtmann, 2008), comparing 
twelve East and West European countries, Reiser (2008) concludes that empirical evidence is 
strong to claim the persistence of local lists. They have been a distinctive feature of local 
politics – albeit with some cross-time variation – in Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and West Germany over the last two decades. Nevertheless, back in the 1960’s, 
Rokkan (1966, 251) already discussed the nationalization of local politics as an incremental 
process until “full nationalization of politics”. Yet far from declining under a process of 
modernization, local lists have even been growing in importance in several countries (Bäck, 
2003; Wille and Deschouwer, 2007; Steyvers et al., 2008; Kjaer and Elklit, 2010b; Ennser-
Jedenastik and Hansen, 2013) and recent scholarship has shown there is an interest in voters’ 
behaviour for the local and not only against the national (Marien et al., 2015). 
This importance of local lists calls for a closer study of the potential nationalization of 
local elections. Such endeavour is key for three reasons. First, in a multi-level perspective of 
politics, scholars have observed a “growing consolidation of the position of local government 
in the respective states. (…) municipalities enjoy more freedom to take on new tasks, are 
legally protected and have more directly the possibility to make themselves heard when it 
comes to decisions on higher levels” (Ladner et al., 2016, 347). Second, following the motto 
“all politics is local”, local elections are often seen as the start of all upper levels objectives 
for political parties, due to the interconnectedness and even interdependency between levels 
(Deschouwer, 2003, 2006; Thorlakson, 2006). Winning local elections can be a springboard 
to win next elections at upper levels Pedahzur and Brichta (2000). Third, on a more 
methodological note and as stated by several electoral scholars (Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1998; 
Wolinetz, 2006), the local level is a great field of research to test hypotheses as it offers the 
largest number of observations in contrast with the number of national elections – and to 
some extent – regional elections. 
The combination of these theoretical and methodological reasons urges researchers to 
question the nationalization of local elections. Such process could be explained by two –
 complementary – mechanisms. On the one hand, it may result from the widening political 
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market taking place at the local level due to voters’ demand to elect representatives – others 
than the ‘old notables’ – more congruent with the increasing socio-economic diversity of 
modern local societies (voters’ demand for ideological alternatives). On the other hand, the 
penetration of national parties at the local level could further be explained by the resources 
these parties enjoy in local competition (party’s organizational capacity). As it reflects an 
impact of the scale of resources available but also the socio-economic diversity of a given 
municipality, nationalization would directly vary according to the size of a municipality. 
The purpose of this article is to test these hypotheses on an original dataset made of 
the coding of each list (N = 1.012) that competed in the 2012 local elections in Wallonia 
where a large number of local lists competed and almost equal number of national lists 
officially supported by well established and deeply rooted national parties. We first lay the 
theoretical foundations of this research before depicting the hypotheses that are then tested on 
the empirical data and discussed in light of the literature on the nationalization of local 
elections. 
 
1. The nationalization of local elections 
The study of the nationalization of elections is a growing industry but the study of party 
systems has tended to focus almost exclusively on the national level (Caramani, 2004). The 
theoretical foundations of the nationalization of local elections can however be traced back to 
Rokkan (1966)’s contribution on Electoral mobilization, party competition, and national 
integration. Based on a historic analysis, Rokkan argued that the process of nationalization of 
local politics is a direct and inevitable consequence of the process of modernization taking 
place since the late 18th century. With the French Revolution European political systems 
encountered an extension of the universal suffrage, a development of mass party membership 
and the emergence of state-wide party organizations competing on functional cleavages. The 
latter have been incrementally cross-cutting the old local and provincial cleavages 
characterizing pre-modern societies1. While this process of modernization initially started at 
the national level – the key locus of power in modern polities of that time – it extended its 
effects on local politics.  
Taking Norway as a case study, Rokkan analysed this process of nationalization 
(“politicisation” in his own words) of the local political arena, that is: “the breakdown of the 
traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally organized parties into 
                                                
1 Territorial politics did not however fully disappear as the centre-periphery cleavage is one the four cleavages in 
the Lipset and Rokkan’s theory (1967). 
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municipal elections” (1966, 244). He argued that the industrialization of economy – and the 
conflicts it triggered between different groups of voters in a given municipality – developed a 
electoral ground for national political parties. They offered electoral alternatives to the ‘old’ 
politics of notables while, competing on the new political cleavages, they better represented 
the distinct segments of societies. The urban areas – given their rapid economic growth and 
the societal conflicts it triggered – were the first to be affected by the process of 
nationalization of local politics. Later, the incremental economisation of rural municipalities 
as well as the spread of socialists and worker unions’ ideas to the countryside ultimately 
resulted in a similar nationalization of the peripheral areas. Overall, the process of 
modernization “intensified the conflicts within the communes and made it impossible to retain 
the traditional system of single-list voting for purely local lists” (Rokkan, 1966, 251). At 
almost the same time, Hjellum (1967) developed the same argument, also on Norway. He 
emphasized the effects of modernization of economy – and the socio-economic diversity it 
caused – as a perquisite for the penetration of national parties into the realm of local politics. 
Studying the nationalization of the British local party systems, Ashford (1975) also referred to 
the process of industrialisation as one of the main factors explaining the presence and 
increasing electoral strength of the Labour party and the Conservatives in British councils.  
A second trend in the literature further focused on the relationship between 
municipality size and democracy discussing – albeit more indirectly – the effect of the former 
on the nationalization of local party systems. According to Dahl and Tufte (1973), there is a 
correlation between municipality size and the number of parties competing as well as the type 
of lists present in a polity. First, the diversity and complexity of issues at stake increases with 
municipality size as the inhabitants are socio-economically more heterogeneous than in 
smaller municipalities (Dahl and Tufte, 1973, 101). Consequently, in greater municipalities 
there is a greater electoral market for additional parties. Second, because the type of political 
discussion at stake fits better the political nature and ideology of the local branches of 
national parties, this is the latter that mostly compete in the largest cities while local lists best 
fit in the less conflictual electoral arena of smaller municipalities (Dahl and Tufte, 1973, 98). 
In this respect, Copus and Erlingsson (2012) have discussed two rival models about the role 
of local and national political parties about local pattern of conflict perception and resolution 
(see also Holtmann, 2008). On the one hand, local lists tend to promote a localism doctrine 
which emphasised ‘factual politics’ and harmonic local governance outside partisan affairs. 
According to Copus and Erlingsson (2012), this non-partisan conception of local politics is 
more present in smaller municipalities – with lower partisan conflictual interests – where 
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local lists are seen “natural born loudspeakers” of factual politics (Holtmann, 2008, 14). On 
the opposite, with the increasing diversity of interests in greater municipalities, there is a need 
for national parties to compete and represent specific rival interests, i.e. parties as aggregators 
of segments of society instead of representing the society as a whole. In the same kind of 
reasoning, Newton (1982, 201) stated that “in that the larger and more urban the authority the 
more likely it is to have not just a party system, but also a developed and competitive party 
system”, i.e. a nationalized party system. Directly inspired form Dahl and Tufte and Newton’s 
theory, Kjaer and Elklit (2010a) recently tested and confirmed that the greater the 
municipality, the greater the nationalization of the local party system in Denmark. As 
explicitly acknowledged by these scholars, municipality size is not the causal factor per se, 
but is a proxy indicator of the municipality’s socio-economic diversity and the conception of 
roles attached to local and national lists. 
Finally, a third type of research agenda focused on the strategic positioning of national 
party as well as their organizational capacity to explain their electoral presence in local party 
systems. In addition to voters’ demand for electoral alternatives in congruence with the socio-
economic mutation of municipalities (i.e. pressures from ‘below’), Hjellum (1967) posited the 
establishment of local branches of national parties as a vote-seeking strategy for national 
elections (i.e. pressures from ‘above’):  
‘National parties also found it to their advantage to establish 
themselves at the local level. This is the other basic reason why the 
parties established themselves at the local level. By establishing local 
organization machinery it seemed possible to use the voter potential to 
better advantage in sorting elections. At the beginning, this motive 
proved strongest within the Labor Party, but little by little the other 
parties also began to give high priority to representation at the local 
level’ (Hjellum, 1967, 75). 
Ennser-Jedenastik and Hansen (2013) extended the analysis of the strategic presence 
of national parties by analysing how the electoral success of this strategic positioning depends 
upon the party’s organizational capacity. They analysed the evolution of the Austrian local 
party systems from 1985 to 2009 and found that when local branches of national parties have 
greater resources in terms of partisan membership, they are more likely to succeed. As a 
consequence, they restrict electoral opportunities for local lists. Besides, their results were 
also conclusive controlling for municipality size. The authors hence concluded that from, an 
organizational perspective, “municipalities offer to independents the chance of succeeding at 
the polls through the effective use of personal networks and door-to-door campaigning, 
contesting elections in larger political entities requires a greater amount of infrastructure, 
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bigger financial resources, and more personnel at one’s disposal. Whereas local branches of 
national parties can rely on support from the federal or regional level, independent lists suffer 
from a competitive disadvantage in this respect” (Ennser-Jedenastik and Hansen, 2013, 788-
789). 
Overall, nationalization of local elections can be explained by two – complementary –
 mechanisms. On the one hand, it resulted from the widening of the local electoral market 
taking place due to the voter’s demand to elect representatives – others than the ‘old 
notables’ – more congruent with the increasing socio-economic diversity of modern local 
societies (i.e. voters’ demand). Various scholars have, however, used municipalize size as a 
proxy for the socio-economic heterogeneousness of a local society. On the other hand, the 
penetration of national parties can further be explained by the resources that parties enjoy in 
local competition (party’s organizational capacity). As it reflects an impact of a scale of 
resources available, nationalization directly vary according to the size of a municipality. This 
distinction refers to two causal mechanisms at work and, therefore, we argue that 
nationalization of local elections should be operationalized and tested along the two causal 
mechanisms identified in the literature, namely the ideological signal sent to the voters 
(voters’ nominal recognition of local and national lists) and the party organizational capacity 
(party’s organic resources of local and national lists). The next section discusses this 
distinction in details. 
 
2. Hypotheses: Distinguishing nominal and organizational effects 
In order to test the nominal and organizational effects of nationalization of local elections, we 
must first discuss the identification of local and national lists from these two perspectives. 
From the viewpoint of the organic identification there is a rather large consensus in the 
literature. Hence, Geser (1999, 3) defined local lists as “groupings that seek formal power 
within communities or municipalities by nominating candidates for local public offices (...) 
[They] have no formal ties to supralocal party organisations”. At the conceptual level, most 
authors agree with this distinction between purely local initiatives and lists supported by 
established state-wide parties (see review in Reiser, 2008) – albeit with some variation. 
Hence, Steyvers et al. (2008) have argued that this dichotomy should be replaced by a 
continuum which better capture specificities of local party politics: they distinguish local, 
pseudo-local, pseudo-national, and national lists. The latter are thus the (quasi) local branches 
of national parties while the former are the (quasi) typical local lists without formal or 
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informal lists with a national party organization. In some countries, the local and national lists 
labels are legally organized and even protected by the electoral laws (e.g. Croatia, Czech 
Republic and Germany). Using the labels of the lists is thus a straightforward 
operationalization of the organic definition of the local party system. However, in many other 
countries, this strategy is not without problems as they are local lists in name that are actually 
sponsored by national parties, i.e. “hidden parties” (Holtmann, 2008, 12). For instance, in 
Belgium national lists are protected at local elections – i.e. independent local lists cannot use 
existing national labels – but there is no specific obligation to force local branches of national 
parties to use them. This is why it often requires time-consuming resources to identify lists 
that are organically connected to national parties in all but in name (Reiser, 2008). While 
acknowledging this issue, several authors have nevertheless used list labels to identify local 
from national party organizations (e.g. Steyvers et al., 2008; Heyerick, 2016). 
Even though this strategy is acceptable for the research objectives of many of these 
authors, it has blurred the distinction between nominal and organic identification as well as 
the two distinct causal mechanisms behind them. Our argument is that labels should be taken 
seriously in their own right as signals sent to the voters, irrespective of the organic proximity 
with the lists. In other words, as the organic definition of local lists should be used for 
analysing the effect of party’s organizational features on nationalization of local politics; 
labels should be used as distinct dynamic of nationalization. When local branches of national 
parties make all efforts to distinguish themselves from national labels, they make a strategic 
choice in sending a non-partisan signal to the voters during the campaign. 
The literature has clearly established that the choice of a list label is nothing but 
neutral. The emphasis on this vote-seeking strategy goes back at least to the works of Downs 
(1957), who already pointed out that parties should provide information shortcuts to voters 
since they have little incentive to acquire costly information about candidates. List labels –
 one of the primary shortcut that political parties offer to voters (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; 
Kam, 2005) – provide them with information about their identity (Raymond and Overby, 
2014) and their ideology (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Aldrich, 1995; Snyder and Ting, 2002). 
In fact, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) have shown that party labels serve an 
informative purpose for voters and such labels should therefore be the result of a meaningful 
choice from candidates. 
Recent works have already offered greater insights about the variety list labels used at 
local elections (Boogers, 2008; Soós, 2008; Boogers and Voerman, 2010). Based on two 
surveys of Dutch local parties in 2005 and 2006, Boogers (2008, 160-161) builds up a 
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typology of local party names. Beside local sections of national parties, he distinguishes 
several types of local party labels with among them: “name of the municipality”, 
“citizenship”, “ideological profile” and “person-based group”. Despite this diversity of list 
labels, two main patterns emerge: on the one hand, nationalization – that is, labels that are 
taken from the realm of national politics and, on the other hand, localism – that is, labels that 
refer to local politics.  
Because of the primary effect of label on voters’ perception, we argue that the 
nationalization of local party systems is also translated into the very name of a list. We argue 
that the nationalization of local politics as a response to voter’s demand is best analysed from 
the viewpoint of list labels (i.e. the ideological cognitive shortcut sent to the voters via 
nominal recognition) while nationalization as a cause of party capacity is a factor of party 
organizational features. Bridging the literature on list labels and theories of nationalization, 
we develop the following hypotheses to test the electoral success of national labels and 
national party’s organizational capacity. 
In line with scholars analysing the impact of socio-economic diversity on 
nationalization, we firstly hypothesize that in municipalities with low socio-economic 
diversity, local labels will perform better than lists with national labels. As mentioned by 
Holtmann (2008, 14), the way citizen conceive the local political arena is based on an ardent 
desire for social harmony of one local communities with dense and intensive interaction. This 
conception is also connected with emotional identification with ‘our village’ and ‘our 
community’. These different meanings attached to municipal politics may increase the 
attractiveness on list labels referring to the harmony and the homogeneity of the local 
community instead of ideological and agonistic cleavages. On the opposite, as mediator 
between society and its political system, national lists labels will become increasingly 
successful when socio-economic diversity increases and would prevail over local labels when 
inequality scores the highest. National lists labels are perceived beyond the mere local interest 
but reflect greater trans-municipal issues. In that case, voters appeal to national parties that are 
moreover already familiar ‘political party’ dealing with problems alike those discussed during 
regional and national elections (Schaffner et al., 2001; Schaffner and Streb, 2002; Garlick, 
2015). Finally, one can expect that lists containing a reference to both the local level and a 
national party could take the best of two ‘worlds’ and perform better, irrespective of the 
degree of diversity. As previous research distinctively stressed that nationalization is 
conditional to the level of inequality of in a municipality, our first set of hypotheses explicitly 
refers to an interactive effect of the socio-economic equality of society on the success of list 
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labels and its electoral success: 
H1a: Local list labels will perform better than national labels when a 
municipality’s socio-economic inequality is at its lowest score. This 
electoral advantage will, however, decrease when inequality increases. At 
the maximum value of inequality, national labels perform better than local 
lists. 
H1b: Lists with mixed labels perform better than other labels, irrespective 
of the degree of inequality. 
 
 The second hypothesis tests the impact of organizational capacity on list performance, 
through effective campaign means. In the smallest municipalities, there is no reason to expect 
difference between purely local lists and local branches of national parties. Although 
candidates from national parties arguably have greater resources at disposal (Heyerick, 2016), 
independent candidates can rely on the personal network they have built in their community. 
They can conduct door-to-door campaign, relying on the “friends-and-neighbours” effects 
(Jennings and Niemi, 1966, 89) which would counterbalance the local branches’ financial, 
human, and organizational capacity (Saiz and Geser, 1999). However, the scale of resources 
necessary to conduct an efficient campaign expands as the municipality size increases. 
Beyond small to medium-size municipalities, the “friends-and-neighbours” effects do not 
serve anymore local lists’ candidates while local branches enjoy a greater organizational 
capacity, which constitutes a decisive electoral advantage as already underlined in the 
literature (Deschouwer and Rihoux, 2008). This gives ground to the second hypothesis: 
H2: In smaller municipalities, there is no electoral advantage between local 
lists and local branches national parties. However, as the municipality size 
increases, national parties gradually benefit from their larger organization 
capacity at the expense of purely local lists. 
 
3. Data and methods 
Case study: Wallonia in Belgium 
This article analyses the 2012 Walloon local elections. Belgium, and Wallonia in particular, is 
one of the countries presenting the highest presence and success of local lists (Reiser, 2008, 
288). It can therefore be considered as an “extreme case” in Europe which is of particular 
interest to test causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2001). Indeed, Wallonia presents a large number 
of local lists despite well-established and deeply rooted national parties at the local level 
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(Deschouwer, 2012). On the nominal dimension, there were actually more list with a local 
label (n=494) or a mixed label (i.e. national labels associated with local labels, n=40) than 
with a national party label (n=478). Form the organic viewpoint, even though local party 
systems were dominated by (quasi) local branches of national parties (n=691), local lists were 
noticeably present at the 2012 Walloon local elections (n=321). Representing 31.7 percent of 
all lists, local lists were highly implemented in Wallonia in comparison to less than 10 percent 
in countries such as Sweden, England or Portugal (see Reiser and Holtmann, 2008). 
Furthermore, Wallonia presents interesting variance on our main variables of interest. First, 
the size of the 262 municipalities as well as their index of inequality vary greatly while the 
following boxplots clearly show that lists – for both the organic and nominal definitions – are 
present on the whole spectrum of municipalities’ size and their index of inequality. Second, 
the four main Walloon national parties were all in government at elections time either at the 
regional (the Socialists, Christian Democrats and the Greens) or at the national levels (the 
Liberals). The absence of national parties in the opposition limits the potential of second-
order effects (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) where voters tend to sanction government parties and 
favour opposition parties. This specific political context permits to better test our hypotheses 
while limiting ‘noise’ from other causal factors. 
Figure 1. Boxplots of lists presence (both nominal and organic definition) according to 
municipality size and index of inequality 
 
   
Before moving to the presentation of data, we briefly discuss some of the Walloon 
features of local governments and its local party systems. First of all, the ‘Code of local 
democracy and decentralization’ (that regulates local politics and elections in Wallonia) 
stipulates that lists are identified by one acronym. The latter is composed of maximum 
12 letters or figures. According to article L4112-5§2 of the Code, the acronym is formed of 
initials of all or some of the words that compose the full denomination of the list. 
Furthermore, political parties represented in the Walloon regional parliament may request to 
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forbid the use of some names. As in the previous elections, national political parties have 
asked to protect the use of their previous names such POB (“Belgian Worker Party”), which is 
the former name of the socialist party. Names as Ecolo-Vert (“Ecolo-Green”) were also 
forbidden because it is ambiguous with the current name of the green party, Ecolo. Beside 
these limitations, local lists have much freedom for choosing their names, contributing to the 
observed large diversity in the names of the lists. The electoral system is the same for all 
municipalities: i.e. a proportional system with semi-open lists where the voter can either vote 
for the list or one or several candidates on the same list. The attribution of seats is based on 
the Imperiali formulae while there is a single electoral district that corresponds to the limits of 
the municipality. The number of seats to be elected in each municipality is proportional to the 
size of the municipality.  
Data collection and operationalization 
We gathered an original dataset on the 2012 local elections in Wallonia. Our dataset is 
comprehensive and includes all the 1.012 lists that presented a valid list of candidates in the 
262 Walloon municipalities in 2012 (i.e. not sample)2. The dataset includes variables at both 
the list and the municipality levels (list label, composition of list, presence at the previous 
2006 local elections, amateurism of the list, incumbent local majority, degree of urbanisation, 
size of the municipality, and type of party competition – including absolute majority). Data 
collection combined official information available online as well as data collected by 
interviews with the leader of the lists (Authors 2013). In this section, we present the 
operationalization of these variables as well as the descriptive statistics of our main variables 
of interests. 
 Our dependent variable is thus the electorate performance of list labels that we 
measure in terms of the percentage of votes obtained by a list at the 2012 local elections. 
Kjaer and Elklit (2010a) have developed an indicator of nationalization of the local party 
system as a whole (taking into account the electoral strength and absence of national parties). 
Although their indicator presents the clear advantage of assessing how local party system 
mirror or deviates from the national party system, its main disadvantage is that it only permits 
to account for variation at the municipality-level, excluding explanatory factors at the list-
level. For instance, the presence of the Mayor or other highly visible political figures such as 
regional/national MPs, the degree of professionalization of candidates, or the newly 
                                                
2 The final model is however restricted to 987 observations after having excluding outlier lists, based on model 
diagnosis. 
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established nature of the list are key factors explaining the electoral success of a list. To test 
our hypotheses, we need to empirically control for these variables at the list-level. This is why 
we use the list’s electoral success as the dependent variable3. The latter has a large variance 
with a minimum of 0.3 percent and a maximum of 100 percent. The mean for the 1.012 lists is 
of 25.9 percent with a standard deviation of 19.9 percent. Considering the continuous quality 
of our dependent variables, the models are multivariate OLS4. 
 
2012 electoral performance = List Label + Inequality + Label * Inequality + Party 
organization + Municipality Size + Party organization * Municipality Size + Controls 
+ Constant + Error 
 
 Our main variables of interest are lists labels (nominal) and party organization and 
how the former interacts with inequality and how the latter interacts with municipality size. 
List labels are easy to identify. All local labels are labels that do not use national labels while 
national labels are one of the labels used (and legally protected) by the main political parties 
represented in the Walloon regional or the federal parliaments. We also included a mix 
category which adopt national labels that is combined with a reference to local politics (such 
as the name of the municipality or a reference to local issues). We decided to extend the 
coding of national labels to the The Workers' Party of Belgium (PTB) because, even though 
they did not have parliamentary representation in 2012, they were receiving increasing 
national media attention reflecting their performance in electoral surveys. As a matter of fact, 
the PTB did obtain both regional and federal parliamentary representation at the 2014 joint 
elections. 
A more difficult task is to identify organically local branches of national parties. For 
parties that used a legally protected national list numbers, this is not a problem. The real 
challenge is to identify local branches of national parties that decided not this national list 
number. They are “quasi-national parties” (Steyvers et al., 2008) showing greater openness to 
civil society including non-partisan candidates and abandoning their national names. We 
                                                
3 We preferred this operationalized over a lagged dependent variable (difference in vote shares since previous 
local elections) because of the volatility of the party systems at the local level. Since the 2006 elections, many 
new local parties have appeared, many have disappeared and a very large number of those remaining have 
changed their list labels, have formed new electoral alliances or have given birth to splinter lists. Altogether, the 
use of a lagged dependent variable would reduce our N to a non-representative sample of local lists while biasing 
our dataset because stability of the party system is greater in larger municipalities. 
4 The 1.012 electoral lists being in competition in specific municipality contexts, both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation are likely to be present in the residuals at the mere lists level. We therefore replicated our models 
with clustered standard errors by municipality. It did not improve the efficiency of T and F tests nor estimators at 
a substantially meaningful level. 
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developed an in-depth analysis of list composition and (in)formal links with national party’ 
organizations surveying all list leaders. They were asked about their relation with national 
party organizations as well as their list composition. We decided to code a list as a local 
branch of national parties when list leaders confirmed explicitly their ties or when a majority 
of the lists was composed of party members. Other lists are considered as ‘independent’ local 
lists from an organic viewpoint. Arguably, this dichotomisation of party organization restricts 
the variance of a list’s organizational capacity existing in real campaign time. Some local 
branches have greater support than other. However, our main argument is that lists linked to 
national parties should overall present higher organizational capacity during an electoral 
campaign than local lists. Even though some of them cannot always rely on national parties’ 
financial support, they can at least enjoy key ‘soft power’ in terms of how to run a campaign, 
in-depth analysis of the electoral context built by party research centres, or ‘standardized 
campaign starting kit’ as confirmed during the survey of list leaders. Even though there is a 
correlation between both the nominal and organic types of lists, a substantial percentage of 
them decided to use a local or a mixed label (i.e. 220 local branches out of 690 or 31 percent). 
An example is the list “Together” directly and officially supported by the Christian democrats 
in Nivelles, a medium city of 26.843 inhabitants. 
 The two other main independent variables are the conditional effects of list labels and 
party organization according to the index of inequality and the municipality size. In this 
article we opted for a direct measure of inequality, instead of relying on a proxy (such as 
municipality size which correlates weakly with the index of inequality: 0.56). The main 
reason is that it directly tackles Rokkan’s explanation of nationalization of local politics: “[i]n 
the more equalitarian primary economy communities of the South and the West the forces of 
territorial defense remained strong and vigorous and resisted effectively the pressures toward 
a polarization of local political life” (1966, 254). We use the index of income asymmetry 
published by the Federal Public Service Economy where lower values indicates greater 
equality between habitants and vice-and-versa for greatest values. The index of socio-
economic inequality oscillates between 0 and 34, mean being of 16.5 while the standard 
deviation equals 6.5. For the municipality size, we use the number of voters registered at 
elections time. Municipality size varies importantly from 1.098 up to 245.701 inhabitants 
(mean: 13.979 and standard deviation: 22.586). Because of the larger number of small to 
medium-size municipalities, the variable is strongly skewed to the left. The variable was thus 
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log transformed5. 
Finally, our models control for variables considered as influential in the list’s electoral 
success: incumbency effects, scope of inter-party competition, degree of urbanization, size of 
the municipality and professionalism of the list. First, we control for the incumbency effects 
at two levels. On the one hand, at the municipality level, we control whether or not the list 
was part of the incumbent majority (either as a single-party majority or as part of a majority 
coalition) at the time of the elections in 2012. A dummy variable is created where the 354 lists 
in office at the moment of the 2012 elections. On the other hand, at the individual level, a 
dummy variable that distinguishes lists where the mayor was present as candidate from other 
lists. Out of 262 mayors, 242 were once again candidates in the local elections, i.e. about one 
quarter of all lists (23.9 percent). We also controlled for the presence of elected officials at 
another level of government. A dummy variable distinguishes the presence on the lists of MPs 
as well as members of cabinets from other tiers of government (regional, federal and 
European.  
Second, we also control for the degree of inter-party competition which has direct 
mechanical effect on list’s electoral performance: the larger the number of lists in 
competition, the lower the percentage of votes each of them can obtained. This effect is 
however directly connected to the electoral strength of electoral lists. In this respect, a 
traditional way to measure inter-party competition is the effective number of parties, based on 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979)’s formula. Although it constitutes a post-electoral indicator, in 
the absence of local surveys in all 262 municipalities, it is the only reliable measure available. 
Besides, it is furthermore fair to assume that in most municipalities electoral results reflect the 
perceived electoral strength during the electoral campaign in the eyes of the voters and the 
parties. This trade-off is anyway much better than relying on the absolute number of parties. 
Indeed, whereas the mean of the ‘absolute’ number of lists per municipality is 4.5 lists, there 
is on average 2.9 ‘effective’ lists. Therefore, a great proportion of ‘absolute’ number of lists 
perform extremely poorly not representing genuine electoral competitors.  
Third, the models control for the degree of professionalism of the list based on two 
indicators. A first very direct indicator is the completeness of the list in terms of candidates. A 
dummy variable is created to distinguish lists presenting as many candidates as the number of 
available seats (complete lists are coded 1 and incomplete lists are coded 0). A recent study 
on Wallonia (Vandeleene et al., 2013) has demonstrated that most independent local lists are 
                                                
5 The interpretation of the results for log-transformed variable can be summed up as a municipality twice bigger 
is associated with (beta of the municipality size variable*ln(200/100)) change in electoral performance. 
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complete lists (n=827) while incomplete (n=185) lists present always a significant proportion 
of vacancy of candidates (two thirds of the incomplete lists have less than 50 percent of 
candidates). Therefore, this dummy can be used as a proxy to control for minor and ‘folkloric’ 
lists that do not seriously compete with office-seeking goals but rather because of the low 
legal prerequisites. It distinguishes therefore more ‘professionalized’ lists that genuinely aim 
– at least in a formal way by presenting a list full of candidates – to obtain or increase their 
representation in the council after the elections. Another indicator is the presence of the list at 
the latest 2006 elections. It is correct that to assume that new lists are not necessarily amateurs 
because a lot of lists are reconfiguration of former distinct list and past alliances. A dummy 
variable is created to distinguish list that were not remotely present in 2006 (even after the 
change of name or through new alliances). This was possible thanks to data collected via 
interviews with leaders of the lists. 
Table 1. Summary of the operationalization of the variables 
Variables Operationalization Details 
Dependent variable Continuous variable List’s share of votes (in percentages) 
Electoral performance at elections  
Main covariate of interest   
List label Categorical variable Ref. = national list label 
List organization Dummy variable Ref. = local branches of national parties 
Municipality size Continuous variable Log-transformed number of voters 
Index of inequality Continuous variable Asymmetry of income by municipality 
Control variables   
Incumbency   
Presence of the mayor on the list Dummy variable Ref. = List without mayor 
List part of the incumbent local majority Dummy variable Ref. = List part of the incumbent majority 
Personalization   
Presence of elected officials from 
another tier of government Dummy variable Ref. = List without elected officials 
Professionalism   
Presence in 2006 Dummy variable Ref. = List not present in 2006 
Complete list of candidates Dummy variable Ref. = List without a complete list of candidates 
 
4. Results 
The results of the OLS are presented in Table 2 that assessed jointly our two hypotheses (i.e. 
controlling the impact of both list labels and party organizational capacity on a lists’ electoral 
performance). The model has a very high model fit with an adjusted R2 of 0.76 percent, most 
of independent variables of interest as well as the control variables are highly significant with 
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often limited standard errors attesting precision in their effect. 
Table 2. OLS model 
Variables Beta (S.E.)  


































List present at the 2006 former elections 0.12 
 
(0.69) 








Party organization * Muncipality size -0.97 
 
(0.96) 




Mixed list label * Index of inequality -0.24 
 
(0.26) 






  (5.31) 
Observations 987 
R2 0.76 
Adjusted R2 0.76 
Residual Std. Error 9.76 (df = 970) 
F Statistic 194.41*** (df = 16; 970) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
Regarding our first hypothesis (list label’s effects on voters’ demand), both the 
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individual and interactive terms are significant. As predicted, the local and mixed labels have 
a statistically significant enhancing effect on a list’s electoral performance vis-à-vis national 
list labels. The interaction of local labels with the index of inequality being negative, the 
enhancing electoral performance of these local labels (vis-à-vis national labels) declines, 
however, in magnitude as the inequality increases. On the opposite, the interactive term of 
mixed labels is not significant confirming that the positive effect of this label is always 
present, irrespective of the degree of inequality. This validates our hypothesis H1.a and H1.b. 
However, to truly appreciate the conditional effects of one variable on the other, we 
plot the interaction and marginal effects following the procedure recommended by Brambor et 
al. (2006, 74). Figure 2 shows how the marginal effect of the list labels on a list’s electoral 
performance varies with the index of inequalities. The X-axis displays variation in the index 
of inequality, the Y-axis presents electoral advantage respectively for the mixed labels (on the 
left) and for the local labels (on the right) vis-à-vis national list labels in percent. The 
histogram at the bottom of the figure shows the distribution of observations along the axis 
while the dotted line indicates a zero-sum gain electoral advantage. 
 
Figure 2. Marginal effect of list labels on a list’s electoral performance (in percent of vote 
share), according to index of inequality 
 
 
First of all, it confirms that the mixed label does have a positive effect on a list’s 
electoral performance (vis-à-vis national labels). Considering the large confidence intervals, it 
confirms that its effects are constant and do not decrease (nor increase) when the inequality 
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differs. Yet, the confidence intervals crossed the zero dotted line when the index of inequality 
is greater than 22.0, the mixed labels ceased then to be an electoral assent. In other words, 
H1.b is almost fully verified: the choice of a mixed label does provide a positive effect vis-à-
vis national label, irrespective of changes in municipalize size. However, it does not provide 
such positive effect where inequality is particularly high (i.e. higher than 22.0), beyond this 
limit there are no significant differences observed with national labels. Secondly, Figure 2 
also clearly shows that local list labels also have a strong enhancing effect on a list's electoral 
when inequality is the lowest. Hence, for the more equalitarian municipality, the electoral 
performance of local label list has a mean effect of 14 percent (8 - 17 percent in the 95% 
confidence interval). Yet, as expected in H1.a, this electoral advantage declines once local 
lists compete in municipalities where socio-economic diversity increases. Where the index 
reaches 26.0, local list labels no longer have a significant enhancing impact on electoral 
performance vis-à-vis national label lists (i.e. the confidence intervals covering the null effect 
on the graph). Contrary to our expectations, national list labels never obtain an electoral 
advantage even in the most inequalitarian municipalities (i.e. the marginal effects never 
become negative outside confidence intervals). 
In order to fully grasp the substantive implication of the findings, Berry et al. (2012) 
suggested to analyse the number of observations that falls under the observed marginal effects 
(based on the histogram of observations indicated at the bottom of the graph). In this respect, 
75 percent of the mixed labels and 80 percent of local labels in competition at the 2012 
Walloon elections fall in the range covered by the positive marginal effects (respectively 
index of inequality smaller than 22 and 28 points). This empirical reality strongly confirms 
that both mixed and local lists are first and foremost a winning vote-seeking strategy in a 
context of stronger equality while these enhancing effects vis-à-vis national list labels 
decreases when inequality increases. Yet, contrary to expectations it never becomes a losing 
strategy even when inequality is the highest. In light of the second hypothesis, we tested the 
effect of party organizational capacity on the electoral performance conditioning municipality 
size. The individual party organization term as well as the interactive term with municipality 
size are not significant (Table 2). Nonetheless, as stated by Brambor et al. (2006, 74): “it is 
perfectly possible for the marginal effect of X on Y to be significant for substantively relevant 
values of the modifying variable Z even if the coefficient on the interaction term is 
insignificant”.  
 
Figure 3. Marginal effect of party organization on a list’s electoral performance (in percent of 
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vote share), according to municipality size (log) 
 
 
Figure 3 confirms that the marginal effect of the party organization does not vary 
along municipality size (because of the large confidence intervals). Nevertheless, this is also 
clear that a local party organization has an overall negative impact on a list’s electoral 
strength. This leads us to partially reject H.2: local branches of national parties perform better 
than independent local lists, irrespective of the municipality size. In fact, whereas we 
expected that, as the municipality size increases, national parties would gradually benefit from 
their larger organization capacity at the expense of purely local lists, we find they have this 
advantage regardless of the size of the municipality. H2 is however fully met in two instances: 
in very small municipalities, on the one hand, and for small national parties in very large 
municipalities (that is above 60.000 inhabitants), on the other hand6. 
 
 
                                                
6 Finally, we also had to check for possible differentiating effects by party. Once we take into account individual 
– national – parties (as a categorical variable in the model), the results are a little bit more contrasted: in case of 
greater inequality, the use of the national label of left-wing parties (Ecolo, PS, PTB) performs better than in 
municipalities with lower inequality. Given the ideological stance and possibly actions of these parties on 
inequalities, this finding is not reallysurprising, and confirms the role of the – choice of the – label of a given list. 
Voters seem to adapt their list’s choice according to the context in which they vote: while in municipalities with 
a high level of inequality voters opt for – left-wing – lists supported by a national party as they see them the most 
able to fight this, in municipalities that do not face as much inequality voters prefer local lists as they see them 
most appropriate to take care of the local governing. There is therefore a nuancing effect by party but that 




In this article, we sought to address the dynamics behind a possible nationalization of 
local elections. Our underlying question was to disentangle the influence of two main 
mechanisms: on the one hand, the effect of the list label as a nominal recognition to be 
understood as an ideological cognitive shortcut and, on the other hand, the role of party 
organizational features that would give local branches of national parties more capacities. 
The wide diversity of Wallonia both in terms of socio-economic and size differences and in 
terms of the variety of lists competing at the local level (basically one third with local labels, 
one third with mixed labels and one third with national labels) offered a fertile ground of 
investigation. 
Even though national parties are still strongly established and benefit from a strong 
organizational capacity, list using national parties’ label attract less voters in comparison with 
lists that display a local label. How can this be explained? One line of explanation is that since 
national parties are decreasingly popular, the use of the national name may frighten potential 
voters (Steyvers et al., 2008, 173). In recent decades, Western democracies have been 
characterized by a decline of party identification and a growing distrust towards professional 
politicians (Wattenberg, 2000; Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Holmberg, 2007; Dalton and 
Welzel, 2014). Disaffection from partisan politics is a general trend observed in most 
comparative studies (Papadopoulos, 2013). In this critical environment, lists with local labels 
may attract more votes because they appear as alternatives to national parties that are 
increasingly rejected. 
Another – complementary – explanation is the local nature of the local elections both 
for lists and voters. From the lists’ perspective, going for a local label may help integrate 
candidates whose ideological preferences do not fit with the national party’s official position 
on certain policy issues (Vandeleene et al., 2013). Similarly, a list that chooses a non-partisan 
list name, and more specifically a local label, may also indicate other policy priorities. The 
distance from the national party also provides more flexibility and independence for the list 
leadership, especially when conflicts occurred between national party leaders and local 
leaders (Carty, 2004). Above all, and this turns to look from the voters’ perspective, going for 
a local label puts the emphasis on the local context and its specific needs. In this respect, 
works on local elections have showed that local lists performed well, but not as much in 
political environment seen as less familiar for local lists (Reiser, 2008). This probably 
explains why local lists ceased to present a notorious advantage only under case of strong 
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inequality. Although there is no ‘magic’ threshold, it is clearly a sign of anti-partisan lists. 
However, not all parties are affected in a similar way, with left-wing parties in municipalities 
with high socio-economic differences. 
To go for a local label or not is a decision of a group of candidates who want to 
compete in local elections. This article shows nevertheless that it is an important decision. 
While this work focused on the electoral performance at elections of list labels via the 
analysis of their share of votes with a within-case cross-comparison controlling for the 
diversity of the municipalities, further research is needed both in times before the elections 
and in times after the elections. Before the elections, works should attempt to grasp more 
finely how and why the choice of a label is made and how this choice evolves over time. 
After the elections, the consequences of this choice should be assessed not only on the 
electoral performance as this paper sought to achieve, but also on politics, namely coalition 
formation, and on policies, whether actions undertaken by lists with local labels differ from 
list with national labels. Such endeavour will help us to shed light on the complex process of 
nationalization. It seems so far, however, that there is not a full nationalization of local 
elections and politics. 
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